

Security: Internet of Things

Based on Trusted Flows

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Background - What is IoT Security?

“Security of the Internet of Things is just security at a larger scale”

-- Steve Lovaas Colorado State University IT Manager

This is not the whole picture...

1. Single purpose devices
 - a. Less complex to model
2. Effects of poor security implementations more profound.
 - a. Pacemaker - stop you heart
 - b. Thermostat - burn down your house



Background - IOT DDOS

- Mirai Botnet
 - 1.1 Tbps peak attack
 - 400,000 devices offered for rent
 - 2.5 Million infected devices
- Repear
 - 9 different exploits attacks
 - Checkpoint security says it found the malware on 60% of networks it monitors.
- Hajime
 - Whitehat vigilante botnet
 - Blocks ports other botnets use as vectors
 - TCP/23 (telnet), TCP/7547, TCP/5555, TCP/5358
 - Signed message, "just a white hat, securing some systems."



Top 10 IoT Vulnerabilities 2014

1. Insecure Web Interface
2. Insufficient Authentication/Authorization
3. Insecure Network Services
4. Lack of Transport Encryption/Integrity Verification
5. Privacy Concerns
6. Insecure Cloud Interface
7. Insecure Mobile Interface
8. Insufficient Security Configurability
9. Insecure Software/Firmware
10. Poor Physical Security


Open Web Application Security Project

OWASP Internet of Things Project

<https://www.owasp.org>



The IoT Security Triad



Hardware

- Encryption
 - Elliptic Curve (Smaller Keys, lower power)
- Verifiable Firmware
 - Firmware must be signed
 - Running firmware must be verified.



Software

- Vulnerabilities on device
 - Insecure web interface
 - Buffer overflows
- Vulnerabilities in protocols
 - Unencrypted protocols
 - Protocol Vulnerabilities
- Vulnerabilities in provider's cloud
 - Weak Encryption
 - Weak Authentication



Network

- Fingerprinting of device
 - Clock Skew - Every clock source is unique (unique != identity)
 - Identify a device based on scans (ports, TCP windows etc)
- Behavior of Device
 - Network trends and patterns of a device on a network over time.
 - Theory: It is more important defining what a device does on the network that what a device is.



Trusted Flows - Introduction

- Stage 1:
 - Learn device behavior on the network
 - Develop a trust model based on this behavior (and a few other attributes)
 - Leverage software defined networking to enforce trust model
- Stage 2:
 - Use behavior as a way to classify device type
 - Use semi-supervised machine learning to apply access controls to devices based on device type.

Trusted Flows - Network Flow RFC

RFC 3697 defines traffic flow as “a sequence of packets sent from a particular source to a particular unicast, anycast, or multicast destination that the source desires to label as a flow.”

Trusted Flows - Defining

- Tuple of 5 IP header features (ip_src,ip_dst,ip_protocol,src_port,dst_port)
- Flow statistics (number of packets, bytes, packets per second, bytes per second,duration)
- Direction (Packets A->B, Bytes A->B, bps A->B)

Example of Network Stats

Conversations: Ethernet

Ethernet: 3C | Fibre Channel | FDDI | IPv4: 31 | IPv6: 3 | IPX | JXTA | NCP | RSVP | SCTP | TCP: 1C | Token Ring | UDP: 2C | USB | WLAN

IPv4 Conversations


| Address A | Address B | Packets | Bytes | Packets A→B | Bytes A→B | Packets A←B | Bytes A←B | Rel Start | Duration | bps A→B | bps A←B | |
|---------------|-----------------|---------|---------|-------------|-----------|-------------|-----------|--------------|----------|-------------|---------|------------|
| 129.82.3.61 | 239.255.255.250 | 7 | 1385 | 7 | 1385 | 0 | 0 | 0.000000000 | 15.2063 | 728.64 | | N/A |
| 129.82.3.53 | 129.82.52.11 | 664 | 1249825 | 258 | 1218831 | 406 | 30994 | 0.075824000 | 29.2422 | 333444.61 | | 8479.26 |
| 129.82.3.213 | 129.82.3.255 | 3 | 276 | 3 | 276 | 0 | 0 | 0.124854000 | 1.5011 | 1470.89 | | N/A |
| 129.82.3.213 | 224.0.0.252 | 2 | 128 | 2 | 128 | 0 | 0 | 0.125359000 | 0.4172 | 2454.57 | | N/A |
| 129.82.3.2 | 224.0.0.102 | 11 | 1034 | 11 | 1034 | 0 | 0 | 0.253477000 | 28.4035 | 291.23 | | N/A |
| 129.82.3.52 | 129.82.3.63 | 5 | 1170 | 5 | 1170 | 0 | 0 | 0.875120000 | 8.7573 | 1068.82 | | N/A |
| 129.82.3.3 | 224.0.0.102 | 10 | 940 | 10 | 940 | 0 | 0 | 2.283909000 | 25.0739 | 299.91 | | N/A |
| 129.82.3.213 | 239.255.255.250 | 4 | 860 | 4 | 860 | 0 | 0 | 3.466888000 | 3.0013 | 2292.37 | | N/A |
| 129.82.3.3 | 224.0.0.13 | 1 | 70 | 1 | 70 | 0 | 0 | 7.073001000 | 0.0000 | N/A | | N/A |
| 129.82.3.2 | 224.0.0.1 | 1 | 60 | 1 | 60 | 0 | 0 | 13.060191000 | 0.0000 | N/A | | N/A |
| 129.82.3.233 | 239.255.255.250 | 4 | 832 | 4 | 832 | 0 | 0 | 13.639861000 | 3.0020 | 2217.20 | | N/A |
| 65.52.108.199 | 129.82.3.53 | 3 | 353 | 1 | 192 | 2 | 161 | 14.787870000 | 0.0751 | N/A | | 17156.41 |
| 74.125.69.188 | 129.82.3.53 | 2 | 121 | 1 | 66 | 1 | 55 | 14.974728000 | 0.0124 | N/A | | N/A |
| 0.0.0.0 | 255.255.255.255 | 1 | 342 | 1 | 342 | 0 | 0 | 15.313319000 | 0.0000 | N/A | | N/A |
| 129.82.3.53 | 172.217.1.206 | 2 | 121 | 1 | 55 | 1 | 66 | 15.600655000 | 0.0026 | N/A | | N/A |
| 40.97.166.34 | 129.82.3.53 | 2 | 151 | 1 | 97 | 1 | 54 | 15.968785000 | 0.0503 | N/A | | N/A |
| 40.97.138.82 | 129.82.3.53 | 6 | 1510 | 4 | 1402 | 2 | 108 | 16.018826000 | 0.0003 | 38149659.86 | | 2938775.51 |
| 129.82.3.52 | 224.0.0.251 | 1 | 60 | 1 | 60 | 0 | 0 | 17.218378000 | 0.0000 | N/A | | N/A |
| 129.82.3.53 | 255.255.255.255 | 1 | 193 | 1 | 193 | 0 | 0 | 17.478668000 | 0.0000 | N/A | | N/A |
| 129.82.3.53 | 129.82.3.63 | 1 | 193 | 1 | 193 | 0 | 0 | 17.479598000 | 0.0000 | N/A | | N/A |
| 129.82.3.53 | 239.255.255.250 | 1 | 46 | 1 | 46 | 0 | 0 | 18.126964000 | 0.0000 | N/A | | N/A |
| 129.82.3.2 | 224.0.0.13 | 1 | 70 | 1 | 70 | 0 | 0 | 19.105339000 | 0.0000 | N/A | | N/A |

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Trusted Flows - Device Behavior

- One-class SVM is an unsupervised algorithm that learns a decision function for novelty detection:
 - RBF (Gaussian Kernel)
 - Classifies new data as similar or different to the training set.
 - Classifies new data as similar or different to the training set.
 - Training set will be previous $t-n$ windows of recent history (data) plus the exponential decay history
 - Testing set will be $t-1$ windows of data.




Trusted Flows - One-Class SVM

Online learning with exponential decay sampling.

$$S_{test} = \sum_{i=0}^{i=-t} i$$
$$S_{train} = \sum_{i=-t}^{i=-t-w} i + \sum_{i=-t-w-1}^{\infty} 2^i$$

 = w = flow stats for given time t



Trusted Flows - Trust

- Trust score based on:
 - What we know about the device (K)
 - Binary Values
 - Certificate (valid) or (none/invalid) = [1,0] or [0,1]
 - Common Vulnerability Scoring System[5] (CVSS)
 - (CVSS = 0) = [1,0] or (CVSS > 0) = [0,1]
 - Shodan[6] presence (present) or (none) = [0,1] or [1,0]
 - Use of encryption
 - Past behavior of device (B)
 - How many outliers outside of boundary over time?
 - m is a factor to adjust the influence of outliers on the trust model.

$$T = \begin{cases} \frac{\sum k_T}{mB}, & \text{if } B \geq 1 \\ \sum k_T, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

$$U = \begin{cases} mB \sum k_U, & \text{if } B \geq 1 \\ \sum k_U, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

$$F_T = [T, U]$$

$F_T \geq F_U$ netflow is allowed
otherwise netflow is denied

Questions